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Coherence-building is a key concept for a better understanding of the underlying
mechanisms of intuition and insight problem solving. There are several accounts
that address certain aspects of coherence-building. However, there is still no proper
framework defining the general principles of coherence-building. We propose a four-
stage model of coherence-building. The first stage starts with spreading activation
restricted by constraints. This dynamic is a well-defined rule based process. The second
stage is characterized by detecting a coherent state. We adopted a fluency account
assuming that the ease of information processing indicates the realization of a coherent
state. The third stage is designated to evaluate the result of the coherence-building
process and assess whether the given problem is solved or not. If the coherent state
does not fit the requirements of the task, the process re-enters at stage 1. These three
stages characterize intuition. For insight problem solving a fourth stage is necessary,
which restructures the given representation after repeated failure, so that a new search
space results. The new search space enables new coherent states. We provide a
review of the most important findings, outline our model, present a large number of
examples, deduce potential new paradigms and measures that might help to decipher
the underlying cognitive processes.
Keywords: insight, intuition, binding, coherence, stage models
INTRODUCTION
During 1916 Max Wertheimer, the famous Gestaltist, and Einstein had several discussions.
Wertheimer was keen to understand Einstein’s outstanding thinking. He realized that Einstein was
already puzzled by apparent unanswerable questions at a very early stage, such as: “What would
happen if one rode on a ray of light, or what would happen if one ran fast enough? Would the light
stop to move?” Einstein felt an incoherence between the novel experimental findings at this time
and the given theoretical assumptions. However, he was not able to put the single pieces together
and arrange them in a new coherent picture. It was unclear how such a new picture should look like.
According to Wertheimer, Einstein experienced the intuition that the common presuppositions in
physics might be wrong. By that time, Einstein had the ingenious insight that the measurement of
time is dependent on the applied frame of reference. By using this insight, he relaxed the existing
dogmas, and eventually the single pieces became part of a coherent picture.
Wertheimer questioned that Einstein attained his great insight by the concatenation of logical
operations. “Einstein did not put ready-made axioms, or mathematical formulas together.” (p. 183).
He emphasized that Einstein’s progress was characterized by structural changes which were
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driven by overcoming the traditional understanding of physical
events, time and simultaneity. Wertheimer remarked that
Einstein’s thinking was often far ahead of the available
mathematical apparatus.
Einstein himself reported that his thinking was not bound
to words. He used mostly pictures and imagination, as his
early thought experiments (Gedankenexperiment, see above)
demonstrated. “I very rarely think in words at all. A thought
comes, and I may try to express it in words afterward”
(Wertheimer, 1959).
Einstein’s thinking showed how literally a new and coherent
picture leads to the solution of a difficult problem.
Currently, coherence-building plays an important role within
cognitive psychology. Coherence is the key concept in a great
number of studies on intuition (e.g., Dorfman et al., 1996;
Shirley and Langan-Fox, 1996; Bolte et al., 2003; Bolte and
Goschke, 2008; Volz et al., 2008; Dehaene, 2009; Topolinski
and Strack, 2009b; Zander et al., 2016) and in a few studies on
insight problem solving (Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987; Bowden and
Beeman, 1998; Kounios et al., 2006).
Intuition can be understood as a widely unconscious process,
which provides a hunch for a judgment, which is often
accompanied by an affective state or gut feeling (Gigerenzer and
Todd, 2001a; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011). A standard task,
which demonstrates the dynamic of intuitive judgments, is the
word-triads task. Mednick and Mednick (1967) introduced this
task. The original task requires finding a fourth word which
builds meaningful compounds with three given words (e.g.,
SALT, DEEP, FOAM could be associated with the word SEA
resulting in three meaningful compounds such as SEA SALT,
etc.). In a modified version (Bolte et al., 2003; Topolinski and
Strack, 2009c) participants were asked to make quick judgments
on whether a given triad was coherent or incoherent without
searching for associates. Note that incoherent trials had no
obvious associate (e.g., DREAM, BALL, and BOOK).
Insight problem solving requires participants to find the
solution to a given problem. E.g., the solution of the above
presented coherent triads or more difficult problems such as
puzzles (Sternberg and Davidson, 1995; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004;
Bowden et al., 2005; Öllinger and Knoblich, 2009; Öllinger et al.,
2014). Insight problems are often characterized by the fact that
they are resistant to standard solution approaches. They often
require restructuring the given problem or goal representation
(Ohlsson, 1984a,b, 1990, 2011; Fleck and Weisberg, 2013). Insight
problem-solving goes usually beyond the information which is
actually given (c.f. Bowers et al., 1990, p. 74).
Although intuition and insight are often treated as different
research domains, they obviously share certain features (see
below). There are only a few studies addressing both and aiming
at an integrated framework (Bowers et al., 1990, 1995; Kihlstrom,
1998; Topolinski and Reber, 2010; Zander et al., 2016). In this
vein, we attempt to provide an integrated view which merges both
domains by rule-based coherence-building processes.
Bowers et al. (1990) seminal work on “Intuition in the context
of discovery” coherence was supposed to be the key process
underlying intuition and insight. Coherence results from a widely
unconscious and guided search process, which converges in
an integrated representation of the given information, which
surpasses the threshold to consciousness.
In greater detail, the guiding stage is driven by spreading
activation within mnemonic networks (Collins and Loftus,
1975). Those activation patterns build up to an implicit
and unconscious “perception of coherence” (Bowers et al.,
1990, p. 74). This tacit perception of coherence guides the
thought toward a more “explicit perception in question.” It is
important to note that Bowers et al. (1990) did not assume
that such an implicit coherent representation is equal to
the later consciously experienced coherence, but provides a
fragmentary representation which could be enriched gradually by
accumulating information.
Eventually, the integrative stage provides the result of a
completed accumulation process. The activation within the
network becomes so strong that it crosses the threshold to
consciousness. At this stage coherence is, recognized as a hunch,
which needs to be validated by an analytic validation process.
Although an exact definition of coherence was not provided,
Bowers and colleagues’ experimental design elucidates its alleged
characteristics, e.g., in experiment 3a Bowers and colleagues
asked participants to find an unknown solution word while a
list of up to 15 clue words was presented subsequently. Each
clue word was associated with the unknown solution word. An
example of the accumulated clues task is for instance: (1) “Times”,
(2) “Inch”, (3) “Deal”, (4) “Peg”, (5) “Head”, (6) “Foot”, (7)
“Dance”, (8) “Table”, (9) “Person”, (10) “Town”, (11) “Math”, (12)
“Four”, (13) “Block”, (14) “Table”, (15) “Box”. The target word is
“Square.”
One result was that participants needed up to 10 clue words
to find the solution. Figure 1 illustrates the idea of associations
and spreading activation. Each clue word is associated with the
unknown target word (solution).
LIMITATIONS OF BOWERS STAGE
MODEL
Given the importance Bowers and colleagues’ approach, we want
to draw attention to a few concerns that we have with the current
model.
First, the idea of a guided accumulation process is striking,
but seems underspecified and unclear. Spreading activation elicits
literally unspecific neighboring nodes in the network. That means
the more clues are provided, the more activity should confuse
the search process. The question is what guides the process?
Pure associations would not be able to guide the process, since
too many unspecific associations are activated by, e.g., 10 very
different clue words. That is, the potential search space would
explode.
We propose that the given information activates concepts
from long-term memory. Spreading activation provides a bulk of
information which either belongs to the solution of the problem
or not. We assume that finding a coherent representation requires
constraining the search space. In the easiest case this could be
attained by identifying overlapping features or meanings as in the
word clue example above.
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FIGURE 1 | Spreading activation and coherence. C1 . . . Cn indicate clue words that were associated with the solution word. W1. . .Wn illustrate activated nodes
which are not associated with the solution. Solid lines show associations with the solution word. Doted lines exemplarily show associations between C1 and other
clues. Dashed lines show spreading activation between words. The length of the lines indicates the strength of the association.
We conclude that for those problems it is necessary
to have a concerted interplay between spreading activation
and constraining (Ohlsson, 1990; Thagard and Verbeurgt,
1998; Thagard, 2002) the activation landscape in a goal-
directed manner. More difficult problem representations require
constraining the search space by prior knowledge, hypotheses or
chunking of information which structures and guides the process
of coherence building (implications see below).
Our second concern refers to the transition between
unconscious and conscious stage is somewhat unclear. We adopt
a fluency account (Topolinski and Strack, 2009a,c) which relies
on the ease of the processing of the given information. We
assume that a constrained activation leads to a balance state
(Heider, 1946), which could easily be processed, and results in
the realization of a coherent state.
Third, the result of the integration process is a hunch or
intuition which had to be validated and checked (Wallas, 1926).
We propose a separate process for that and a re-entry loop, if the
result is unsatisfactory or erroneous (Figure 2). Importantly, after
repeated failure it might be necessary to restructure the search
space to find a coherent state in an even larger search space. The
new search space allows to integrate new information.
We hypothesize that this four-stage model allows to describe
coherence-building. We further suggest that at each stage implicit
and explicit processes are involved, however, the ratio between
them varies to a great extent across stages. Therefore, different
measures are necessary to pinpoint the underlying cognitive
processes at the different stages.
In the following section, we will elaborate on the four stages by
collecting evidence from different fields for each stage.
STAGE 1: SPREADING ACTIVATION AND
CONSTRAINING
As Figure 1 illustrates a spreading activation account is not
sufficient to explain the emergence of coherence. Pure spreading
activation would result in an unsynchronized activation of
unrelated information which distorts the coherence building
process (see Wns in Figure 1).
We assume that each word activates associations (via
spreading activations in the semantic network). The given
clues are constraining (shaping) the search space. They are
strengthening particular features of the activated concepts, and
inhibiting others, at the same time. The interplay between the
features of the clues, which also could be interrelated, constrains
the search space until the solution word is isolated. Coherence is
attained by finding the intersection of all the associations of the
clue words. For the clue experiment that means that the more
clues are provided, the narrower becomes the search space until
the target word is isolated. The more overlapping associations the
clues have, the more likely is the detection of a coherent state.
For the word triads task this would explain why “coherent triads”
are processed faster than “incoherent triads.” Incoherent triads
share less association which constrain the search space, whereas
coherent triads do.
Our argumentation is closely related to the work of Holyoak
and Thagard (1995), Thagard and Verbeurgt (1998) and Thagard
(2002). They provided a rule based definition of coherence.
Coherence follows a constraint satisfaction process. Constraint
satisfaction is an idea which was successfully applied in
connectionistic models, for example to model ambiguous figure
perception (McClelland et al., 1986; McClelland and Rumelhart,
1989). An illustrative example is for example a model of the
Necker cube (Necker, 1832), where the nodes of one cube
representation exited themselves in parallel. That leads to a stable
and coherent state. The exited nodes concurrently inhibit the
nodes of the alternative cube representation.
Thagard and Verbeurgt (1998, see p. 2–3 for the detailed list)
stated seven computational principles that define coherence:
(1) Elements are representations (e.g., concepts, images, etc.).
(2) Elements can cohere or be incoherent.
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FIGURE 2 | A four-stage model of coherence-building. The search starts in a restricted search space (white rectangle at the top). After spreading activation and
constraining coherence can be detected or not. A subsequent evaluation stage validates and assesses the result of the coherence detection process. Either a
solution is found or a failure occurs. After a failure the search process re-starts at stage 1 or the search space is restructured resulting in a larger search space (gray
rectangle + white rectangle).
(3) If two elements cohere there is a positive constraint between
them. If they are incoherent there is a negative constraint.
(4) Elements are to be divided into ones that are accepted
(cohere) and ones that are rejected (incoherent).
(5) A positive constraint between two elements can be satisfied
either by accepting or rejecting both elements.
(6) A negative constraint between two elements can be satisfied
by accepting one of the elements and rejecting another.
(7) The coherence problem consists of dividing a set of
elements into accepted and rejected sets in a way that
satisfies the most constraints.
That means for the clue task we start with the clues “Times”
and “Inch.” Let us further assume that the concept “Times”
activates among others a concept such as “Newspaper,” and “Inch”
a concept such as “unit of measurements,” which results in a
negative constraint between the activated concepts. A “feeling”
of incoherence would occur. Providing additional information
result in a coherent state until positive constraints between all the
concepts are mutually activated.
Einstein struggled with incoherent pictures resulting from
pieces of information which did not fit together. Re-connecting
the given information with the new understanding of the
importance of reference frame resolves the incoherence and
consequently results in a coherent picture – positive and satisfied
constraints.
However, Einstein’s thinking also shows the limitation of a
pure constraint satisfaction account, because the solution is not
always available in the initially activated search space. Sometimes
it is necessary to overcome the given constraints to find novel
coherent states (see stage 4 below).
Another question related to constraint satisfaction is how
coherence could be implemented at a neuronal level. Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) proposed a neural theory of metaphor (NTM)
(Lakoff, 2009, 2014) which provides a detailed mechanism for
coherence-building that has some relevance for our discussion.
The following elements consolidate NTM (Lakoff, 2009):
• Neural groups. Small networks of neurons. Neurons can
mutually be part of different groups.
• Spreading activation and Hebbian learning. Neural groups
could inhibit or activate other groups. Important is the
assumption that when two groups are simultaneously
activated they become connected. This Hebbian learning
principle (Hebb, 2005) might also be a key mechanism
which is until now widely neglected in the domains of
insight and intuition.
• Binding. There are three degrees of binding. Permanent
(e.g., red ball – the red color is bound permanently to the
round shape), conditional bindings – the binding is still
permanent, but could have discrete forms (e.g., an object
which is changing colors). Nonce – binding that happens
on the fly.
• Fit. A node A fits better to a network N than to a network N’
if A in N showed a higher overall number of neural binding
than in N’ (see p. 24).
We postulate that a coherent state is closely related to Gestalt
circuits. There are some nodes, e.g., A, B, C, D, and a Gestalt node
G (Figure 3). If node G is firing, the nodes A, B, C, D are also
firing. If a few nodes are activated and a threshold is surpassed,
G is elicited. When G is inhibited, at least one of the other nodes
is also inhibited. We propose that a Gestalt node could serve as
coordinating hub which binds together information. The node
G constrains the search space exciting A, B, C, D and inhibiting
other nodes like E, F. NTM provides several mechanisms how
distant concepts are linked together and how inferences could
be drawn. Most important is the assumption that co-activation
of remote concepts link those concepts and result in a coherent
state.
We assume that for the clue example each single word could
be seen as Gestalt node. The word co-activates several other
words or meanings that are linked to this word. At the beginning
(i.e., providing the first few clues) the clues excite remote and
only partial and weak overlapping nodes. The more clues that
are presented, the more likely it becomes that a particular node
will be co-activated increasingly until it reaches the threshold to
consciousness. The target word could be viewed as a new Gestalt
node which binds distinct features of all the other clue words
together.
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FIGURE 3 | Illustration of a Gestalt node which is tightly connected
with the four other nodes.
The tight link between Gestalt perception, binding, and
consciousness was shown by the detection of synchronized EEG
signals (Singer, 1999; Engel and Singer, 2001; Jung-Beeman et al.,
2004; Uhlhaas et al., 2006; Öllinger, 2009). An instructive example
is the sudden recognition of an ambiguous figure, showing
a Dalmatian dog sniffing at the ground (Tallon-Baudry and
Bertrand, 1999). At the first glance the image seems a scrambled
pattern of black and white colored patches. After a while the
patches re-organize apparently out of nothing to an arrangement
of meaningful objects. One explanation for this phenomenon
emphasizes the importance of gamma-oscillations when viewers
consciously recognize the Dalmatian dog. Tallon-Baudry and
Bertrand (1999) proposed that this pattern stands for a binding
process building a coherent picture from scrambled information.
STAGE 2: COHERENCE DETECTION
How does a person realize that a coherent state is reached?
There are two intimately related concepts which might address
this question. First, Topolinski and Strack (2009a,b,c), Topolinski
et al. (2009), Topolinski and Reber (2010) showed that process
fluency is closely related to a coherence state. As mentioned above
coherent triads are processed more fluently than incoherent
triads. Process fluency could be defined as the ease with which
given information is processed by the cognitive system.
Process fluency could also be exploited as an indicator
showing a transition in a person’s behavior while solving a series
of problems. Haider and Frensch (1999), Wagner et al. (2004),
Gaschler et al. (2013), Haider et al. (2013), Dietrich and Haider
(2015) have been pursuing the idea that during learning of skills
there are such transitions. They used for example the number
reduction task (Wagner et al., 2004). In this task, participants
were confronted by strings composed of three different digits.
E.g., the string 1 1 4 4 9 4 9 4. There are two rules that have to
be obeyed:
(1) Same rule: two identical digits reduce to the same digit.
1 1→ 1
(2) Different rule: two different digits reduce to the third digit
1 4→ 9
The task is to process the string stepwise from left to right.
For the example given above 1 1 → 1. Then the task requires
problem solvers to use the result from the first reduction and to
take the next number from the string: 1 4 → 9; etc. The result
of number reduction will be 9 for the string above. The strings
were composed in a way that they either could be solved by this
step-wise or sequential method, or much faster by realizing that
there is a hidden rule, where the solution to the problem is already
determined after the second attempt, since the sequence of the
reduced digits is symmetrical [see Wagner et al. (2004) for the
details of the task].
The number reduction task allows the moment of time
to be determine when participants utilize the hidden rule.
A sudden drop in the solution time is detectable, which could
not be explained by step-wise learning process. Haider et al.
(2013) postulated that after a large number of attempts implicit
processes extract and detect the underlying regularity of the given
sequences. This enters a processing shortcut resulting in a much
higher process fluency. Such distinct behavioral changes could be
realized consciously by the participants. The realization allows
insight to be gained consciously into the symmetric nature of the
response strings.
Another indicator that helps to realize a coherent state is
the change of the affective state. This addresses the famous
Aha! experience. The Aha! is described by a few dimensions,
such as suddenness, positive affect, or the feeling of being right
(Topolinski and Reber, 2010; Danek et al., 2013; Danek and
Wiley, 2016). It seems conceivable that such changes could
easily be detected by the problem solver and could lead to the
re-evaluation of the problem-solving process.
It is important to note that an Aha! experience is not a proper
predictor for the correctness of the solution (Koffka, 1935; Danek
and Wiley, 2016; Salvi et al., 2016).
STAGE 3: EVALUATION
At this stage the result of the coherence-building process is
evaluated. The problem solver validates whether the solution fits
the given requirements and meets the desired goal. The solution
is either found and coherent or the result is incorrect, which
necessitates a restart of the search.
Heider (1946) called a coherent state a state of balance.
The given elements (information) fit together and there are no
contradicting relations between the given elements. Following
Heider’s account explains the need for coherence. Incoherence
leads to tension within the system and there is a tendency toward
a balance state. This might explain, why at the first place the
cognitive system has a drive toward coherence. Heider’s field
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theoretical approach addressed the relations between persons
and objects. Heider aimed at providing the determinants of
social behavior and social perception. Beyond that, we propose
that Heider’s account is generally applicable to situations where
mutual relations of interdependent information are given.
It provides a rule-based framework explaining the dynamics
of coherence-building. Cartwright and Harary (1956, p. 266)
summarized Heider’s account as follows.
Given a P-O-X unit consisting of a person P, another person
O, and an impersonal unit X. The relations of each part of the
unit are interdependent with each other. If P likes O and O is
seen as responsible for X then there would be a tendency that
P also would like X. This would be a balance state. If X has
a negative relation with P then an imbalanced state results. In
the person O the need arises to change the situation toward a
balance state, e.g., by changing the relation between P and O
from “like” to “not like.” A state of balance results Cartwright
and Harary (1956) showed by a general graph theoretical account
that Heider’s three elements approach can be extended to more
complicated situations.
Following this account incoherence lead to the drive to search
for a state of balance, and there is a schema that justifies
that the deductions within the given information are mutually
consistent. This implies the search for new relationships between
the existing information driven by logical consistency with the
existing information. This search process might to a great extent
be unconscious, but will be shaped by the person’s attention,
deliberations, prior knowledge, attitudes, and motivations.
The theory of balance has some similarities with Thagard
and colleagues’ idea of constraint satisfaction (see above). An
important question is how the cognitive system resolves existing
conflicts.
Hélie and Sun (2010) proposed an elegant framework that
provides a conflict resolution mechanism. Their explicit-implicit
interaction theory (EII theory) assumes the parallel activation
of implicit processes which are mainly associative. In contrast,
explicit processes are driven by attention and characterized by
more precise and distinct information processing. The explicit
processes are predetermined by hard constraints. Processing of
a new problem activates simultaneously the two systems. Conflict
resolution is necessary, when no satisfying result is found. As
a consequence, the results from both systems (implicit–explicit)
will be integrated into one representation. This result is fed in
as new input. The program cycles to the conflict resolution and
integration cycle until the goal state is found.
The authors tested their model by a famous study on insight
problem solving (Durso et al., 1994). Originally, Durso et al.
(1994) introduced a graph theoretical approach. The approach
combined the idea of semantic network analysis and the concept
of restructuring (Ohlsson, 1984a,b). The goal of the study was
to uncover participants’ underlying knowledge structures when
solving an insight problem. Durso et al. (1994) asked participants
to solve the following puzzle: “A man walks into a bar and
asks for a glass of water. The bartender points a shotgun at the
man. The man says, ‘Thank you,’ and walks out.” (Durso et al.,
1994, p. 95). While solving the problem participants answered
‘yes’ and ‘no’ questions. The questions were intended to reveal
the individual problem representation, e.g., question: “Was the
man thirsty?” – answer: “No”. Afterward participants were asked
to judge the relatedness of concepts of pairs (e.g., bartender,
surprise). From this data semantic graphs were construed. In the
next step, the authors compared the semantic graphs of solvers
and non-solvers. It was found that solvers represented more likely
direct connections between concepts which refer to the solution
(e.g., surprise and remedy). Non-solvers focused more strongly
on facts which were explicitly given (e.g., bartender and man).
Solvers represented important aspects of the problem very early.
Durso et al. (1994) concluded that the relatedness between certain
concepts determines the likelihood for restructuring (see below,
stage 4).
Given this finding Hélie and Sun (2010) modeled the
hiccups problem with the connectionistic network (CLARION).
CLARION’s explicit knowledge system was fed with answers
to the yes–no questions. Initially, it mainly represented the
given task instruction. The associations between concepts were
randomly determined and built the implicit system. The degree
of randomness was varied between conditions. The authors found
that the higher the randomness score, the more likely is a graph
structure which resembles the solvers’ structure actually found by
Durso et al. (1994). Higher variation rates allowed a better conflict
resolution that result in the desired solution.
Importantly, the authors suggested that higher randomness
leads to more frequent remote and distant concept associations.
Those associations are often incoherent with the given explicit
knowledge representation. The conflict between the implicit and
explicit representations might result in the generation of new and
insightful hypotheses which help to solve the problem.
Conflict detection plays also an important role in the field
of intuition research. Kahneman (2012) showed how misleading
first intuitions could be. E.g., in the famous Linda problem
a number of statements about a fictive person were given.
Linda is 31 years old, outspoken, bright, single. She majored
in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with
issues of discrimination, social justice, and also participated in
anti-nuclear demonstrations (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983).
After reading the description participants were asked to
choose the statement which seems more probable. (a) Linda is
a bank teller. (b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement. Almost all participants opt for statement (b). The
answer is wrong. Assuming the probability that Linda is a bank
teller is 60% and the probability that she is active in the feminist
movement is 70%. The product (conjunction) of both is 42%
(0.6 × 0.7 = 0.42). The product is always smaller than each
multiplier. Consequently, option (a) is the only correct answer.
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) proposed that participants used
an implicit (intuitive – system 1) heuristic which is biased toward
option (b), because (b) seems more representative than (a).
After a deliberate evaluation (system 2) it should become clear
that (a) is the correct answer. In our discussion that means
that a first coherent representation of the problem results from
prior knowledge constraints or heuristics which restrict the
evaluation process. Consequently, a conflict is detected between
the apparent solution and the actual (logical) solution. In our
model the participant would also commit an error, since an
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 827
fpsyg-08-00827 May 24, 2017 Time: 15:59 # 7
Öllinger and von Müller Search and Coherence-Building
external feedback – whether the solution is correct – would be
necessary at the evaluation stage to restart the process. Then the
coherence building process could be restructured. We do not
agree with Kahneman’s conclusion that intuitive processes are per
se problematic. Moreover, there are alternative accounts which
demonstrate how the conjunction fallacy could be explained (e.g.,
Tentori et al., 2013).
In contrast to Kahneman, Gigerenzer and Todd (2001a,b),
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011), Mega et al. (2015) assumed
that intuitions help solving problems fast and frugal, e.g., facing
the following question: “Which city has the better football team –
Karlsruhe or Munich?” You do not know Karlsruhe, so you opt
for Munich. The recognition heuristic (Gigerenzer and Todd,
2001a) helps to solve the problem. The idea is that uncertainty
is reduced by relying on the ease of recognition. That means
that a processing advantage indicates a potential solution to the
problem. In our example, larger cities are more familiar. This
corresponds to a higher likelihood of having a successful football
team. However, Gigerenzer’s approach has also its limitations.
Changing the cities in the above example and using the cities
Nuremberg and Hoffenheim would result in a wrong solution by
the recognition heuristic. Hoffenheim is fairly unknown but has
the better football team than Nuernberg.
In sum, both the deliberate and the intuitive account need
an evaluation process which justifies that the found solution
is plausible and reliable. Both systems can provide erroneous
results.
Generally, Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) criticized (sensu
Keren and Schul, 2009; Keren, 2013) that the dichotomy between
an intuitive and deliberate system might be arbitrary. They
proposed a rule-based account which relies in principle on
if-then rules, as does our approach. The authors elaborated
on this assumption and demonstrated that deliberate and
intuitive judgments could be based on the same rules, as they
demonstrated for the recognition heuristic (p. 100). They further
assume that rules could be hardwired and explicit rules become
implicit after training and expertise. The rule selection process
is constrained by the task type. Certain heuristics do fit the
task requirements others do not. Again, expertise and prior
knowledge play an important role.
Thomson et al. (2015) provided a cognitive model that is based
on the ACT-R framework to model intuitive-decision-making.
ACT-R is a sophisticated production system. Productions consist
of an IF statements (conditions) and a THEN part which
represents an action. If a condition is matched the production
system will execute an action. Productions could be newly
learned, modified, or compiled. They are mostly explicit at
the beginning of learning, and become implicit after repeated
training. The ACT-R system is divided into an implicit and
a declarative memory system (explicit), and has a goal stack
which controls the flow of operations like a working memory.
Information is stored in chunks. The strength of a chunk is
determined by its recency and its frequency of retrieval (ease
of recall). The authors assume that implicit memory content
is activated by matching the given information. Spreading
activation is pre-supposed and implemented by allowing
associations between existing chunks. Attentional processes
guide activation. The strengths of associations are determined
by their co-occurrence in the past. The authors emphasized that
intuition is a blend of consciously accessible and consciously
inaccessible information. They suggest that retrieval processes
are mainly unconscious, whereas declarative knowledge elements
and the selection of heuristics and strategies are more deliberate
and conscious.
Taken together the results of different fields show that intuitive
and insightful problem solving could be modeled by rule-based
accounts that entail similar properties (like implicit and explicit
systems). Problem solving needs both systems to detect conflicts
which drive the search for new associations. Eventually, the
search results in new coherent state. However, there are situations
where the building of new associations or the combination of
implicit and explicit information is not enough. These situations
require a deeper structural change, namely the restructuring of
the search space.
STAGE 4: RESTRUCTURING AS
COHERENCE BUILDING PROCESS
The Gestalt psychologists (Wertheimer, 1923, 1959; Duncker,
1935; Koffka, 1935; Katona, 1940; Köhler, 1947) showed a
major interest in answering the question under which conditions
perceptual information is grouped to meaningful units. They
identified that similarity, symmetry, and the proximity of
perceptual elements affect the grouping process. For Köhler
(1947), Wertheimer (1959) re-grouping (restructuring) of the
given information was the major factor for productive or
insightful thinking.
Figure 4 illustrates the grouping dynamics by the
Parallelogram-Square problem (Wertheimer, 1925). The
task requires determining the total sum of the area of the
parallelogram plus the area of the square, given “a” and “b”
(Figure 4A). A beautiful solution entails that the given lines are
restructured so that two rectangular triangles result (Figure 4B).
Eventually, the triangles form a rectangle (new grouping,
Figure 4C). Now, it is simple to determine the area “a”× “b”.
Within the field of insight problem solving constraints play
a significant role (Isaak and Just, 1995; Knoblich et al., 1999).
Ohlsson (1992, 2011) argues that a problem activates prior
knowledge from long-term memory. The activated knowledge
imposes constraints on the representation. It was demonstrated
in several studies (Knoblich et al., 1999, 2001; Kershaw and
Ohlsson, 2004; Öllinger et al., 2006, 2008, 2013, 2014; Danek et al.,
2013, 2014; Kershaw et al., 2013) that self-imposed constraints
caused the main source of problem difficulty. The relaxation of
constraints leads to a new problem representation which allows
for novel insights. There is a major transition from a state of “not
knowing a solution” to a state of “knowing a solution” (Ohlsson,
2011; Danek et al., 2014).
It is important to note, that constraint satisfaction does not
need to provide a solution. Figure 5 shows the famous Nine-
dot problem. The task is to connect the given nine dots by four
connected straight lines, without lifting the pen, or retracing a
line.
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FIGURE 4 | Wertheimer’s Parallelogram-Square problem. (A) Initial state. (B) Restructuring of lines. (C) Solution.
FIGURE 5 | (A) The initial problem representation of the Nine-dot problem. (B) Perceptual coherence constrains the search space. (C) Enhanced search space after
the perceptual constraint is relaxed.
The Nine-dot problem proves to be extremely difficult. The
common explanation claimed that a Gestalt-like perception of
the given nine dots prevents drawing lines beyond the perceptual
boundaries (Maier, 1930; Kershaw and Ohlsson, 2004; Öllinger
et al., 2014). Importantly, and hardly recognized was the fact
(Öllinger et al., 2014) that after problem solvers had relaxed
the perceptual constraint an even larger search space resulted –
adumbrated in Figure 5C. The scattered dots emphasize that
after constraint relaxation (restructuring) lines could be drawn
to arbitrary positions outside the boundaries of the nine dots.
Consequently, it is not trivial to find the correct sequence of lines
connecting all dots (Weisberg and Alba, 1981). Öllinger et al.
(2014) showed that the concerted interplay between heuristics –
restricting the search space – and constraint relaxation –
expanding the search space – is sufficient to solve the problem.
In sum, restructuring allows problem solvers to search for
the solution within a new search space. The larger search space
enables the activation of new concepts. The new concepts could
be integrated or build interrelationships with already existing
concepts of the problem representation. It is necessary that the
larger search space is restricted by constraints that guide the
coherence-building process.
EXAMPLES AND GENERALIZATION
In this section, we elaborate on the stage model. Figure 6 shows
an introductory example which illustrates the basic principles of
coherence-building. First, three arbitrary dots were presented.
According to our model, in stage 1 implicit processes spread
activation and constrain the search space by prior knowledge.
The dots “start” to build interrelationships with each other. At
a neural level the dot pattern results in a synchronized spatial
activation pattern which organizes the three dots into a unified
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FIGURE 6 | Process of perceptual organization. (A) Three arbitrary dots are given. (B) Interactions between dots unfold interrelationships and meaning.
(C) Higher order meaning of a triangle could emerge.
representation (Koffka, 1935; Singer, 1999; Engel and Singer,
2001; Tallon-Baudry, 2003; Hebb, 2005).
Following Lakoff’s approach (Figure 3) the three dots will be
connected via a Gestalt node which concerted the interplay and
co-activation (Hebbs rule: “fire together wire together”) of the
three dots. The Gestalt node coordinates the coherent state. The
three dots build a triangle. The concept of a triangle (another
Gestalt node) is associated with knowledge about triangles (form,
rules, and theorems). This would be the result of stage 2. At a
conscious level the recognition of a triangle occurs. At stage 3
the evaluation could focus on the question, whether this finding
is significant, reliable, or interesting. However, it is not necessary
and pre-determined that a triangle is recognized. Other coherent
representations are conceivable and are mostly driven by the
given task set, context, prior knowledge, and/or instructions,
e.g., the three dots could also activate the concepts of a number
(three) or trinity. Others will recognize the dots as representing
individual subjects who have certain relationships – two of the
dots seem to be linked closer. One seems to be more distant. In
principle, a rather large number of coherent states are possible,
all of them could be evaluated or further developed. Maybe the
last example led the reader into a phase of restructuring which
changes the coherence-building process (stage 4) from triangle to
social domain.
Japanese haikus (von Müller, 2015) illustrate the dynamics
of coherence-building in a more sophisticated field. Haikus are
poems that have a well-defined phrase structure like in the
famous haiku:
the stillness
penetrating the rock
a cicada’s cry
Basho (1644–1694)
Initially, reading Basho’s beautiful haiku word by word might
seem confusing. It did not immediately become clear what is
meant by the given words and how they are interrelated – a state
of imbalance and conflicts might occur. After a few iterations
through the phrases it is possible that new interrelationships
between the concepts were elicited. First there is the image of a
state of silence that is turned into a state of noise by a cicada’s
cry. The contrast increases and is emphasized. It is alternating
between stillness and noise, where both are so intense that even a
rock is penetrated. This draws the picture of strong forces which
almost hurt. Lastly, it is imaginable to assign different directions
to the forces caused by noise and stillness. It seems that noise
drills into the rock, whereas stillness corrodes the rock. The whole
meaning unfolds from the presence of all three parts of the haiku
and the constant re-interpretation (restructuring) of the different
parts might result in a vivid image of the scene until a beautiful
coherent representation (image) results.
Haikus might provide a rich source for new empirical research,
e.g., to investigate in more detail how coherence-building is
influenced when the order of the phrases is shuﬄed or words
are replaced or substituted? Would it result in the same coherent
image at the end or would it result in a distorted image which
becomes meaningless?
Our final example is taken from the domain of insight problem
solving. It is used to demonstrate how our model promotes a
more detailed and elaborated view on problem representations
of already well-known standard insight problems. We chose
Duncker’s (1945) tumor problem: “Given a human being with
an inoperable stomach tumor, and lasers which destroy organic
tissue at sufficient intensity, how can one cure the person
with these lasers and, at the same time, avoid harming the
healthy tissue that surrounds the tumor?” Duncker used thinking
aloud protocols as one of the first to uncover participants
thought processes (Ericsson and Simon, 1993). Figure 7 showed
Duncker’s thinking aloud analysis of various solution attempts.
The most right-hand path in Figure 7 shows an elegant
solution to the problem. The solution requires superimposing
rays of weak intensity at the tumor, so that the tumor is destroyed
and the surrounding skin is not affected.
The tumor problem proved as reluctant to hints and analogical
transfer (Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983), and was difficult to
solve. For quite a long time it was unclear, what caused the
difficulty of the problem.
Grant and Spivey (2003) provided participants with a sketch
of the problem, such as Figure 8. In a first experiment, they
recorded the eye-movement patterns. They analyzed the patterns
of successful and un-successful problem solvers. They found
that successful solvers more likely attended to the surrounding
skin, whereas unsuccessful participants fixated on the tumor.
Ingeniously, the authors run a second experiment with three
conditions. In the animated skin condition, the skin was
flickering. In the animated tumor condition, the tumor was
flickering. In the third condition a static picture was presented
(control condition). As expected the animated skin condition
outperformed the two other groups (solvers: 67% animated skin;
33% animated tumor condition, 37% static control condition).
Duncker’s and Grant and Spivey’s findings suggest an
initial representation of the tumor problem as depicted in
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FIGURE 7 | Duncker’s thinking aloud graph. The top node represents the task. Branching from the task three general approaches are illustrated which were
further detailed.
FIGURE 8 | Grant and Spivey’s tumor problem.
Figure 9A. Initially, the given concepts were constrained by
the importance of the tumor and did not integrate the remote
concept “superposition” which is the key concept of the
solution. After evaluation (stage 3) it becomes clear that a
solution within this representation is impossible and a state
of imbalance is achieved which increases the need to drive
toward a state of balance. Restructuring (stage 4) is necessary
which expands the search space. For the tumor problem
restructuring requires a broad associative search with a high
variation rate (Hélie and Sun, 2010). Importantly, the search
process is not blind, but guided by constraints which are
stated by the instruction and the goal representation which is
strongly tied to the concept of “skin” (Dietrich and Haider,
2015). New associations are possible and a state of balance
between the given concepts could be attained. Consequently, a
coherent representation results which entails the solution to the
problem.
According to Grant and Spivey’s (2003) finding skin becomes
the driving concept which integrates superposition and leads to
new interrelated concepts. Hebbian learning is elicited and leads
to a new coherent representation which links the concepts tumor,
destruction, laser, and superposition.
Currently, we realize a big gap between the empirical data
which demonstrates effects according to varying experimental
conditions and the underlying knowledge structures. We propose
that our four-stage model allows for the pinpointing of
knowledge structures. To do so, it is inevitable to validate
hypothetical assumptions on potential problem representations
by using quantitative measures which reveal the actual knowledge
structure. We assume that the four-stage model might help
to choose the appropriate means. In the next section we will
summarize a few potential measures at the behavioral level.
MEASURING COHERENCE BUILDING
Since the early work of cognitive psychologist (Newell and Simon,
1972) it has been a main goal to discover significant individual
representations during the stream of problem solving. This also
holds true for measuring coherence. How could the experimenter
realize that a coherent state is achieved? Answering this question
is important for the empirical test of our model. We assume that
it is helpful to have different measures which could be assigned
to the different stages of our model. We enlisted a few potential
measures:
(1) Measuring processing speed. Measuring either the
detection of coherence (stage 2) (Topolinski and Reber,
2010), or significant changes of the problem representation
(Wagner et al., 2004) by faster response times or sudden
drops of the processing speed.
(2) Implicit measures like lexical decision tasks or implicit
association tasks to reveal which key concepts (Gestalt
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FIGURE 9 | (A) Hypothetical initial representation of the tumor problem. (B) New coherent representation of the problem.
nodes) are activated during spreading activation by an
individual at the beginning of the problem solving process
or later on (stage 1–stage 4). This is crucial for learning
more about the actual representations of the problem and
potential changes during the time course.
(3) Semantic differentials or yes–no questions to assess whether
a concept is part of the problem representation or not
(Dayton et al., 1990; Durso et al., 1994) (stage 1, 2). This
allows to generate knowledge graphs.
(4) A new approach to measure coherence would be to ask
participants to draw explicit problem representations like
in Figure 9 by themselves after certain time intervals.
The graph consists of the explicable basic concepts which
are supposed to be important for the problem. The links
between the lines reflect the association, and the thickness
of the lines reflects the alleged strength of the concepts. The
time series of individual representations reveals changes
or mental impasses. Limitation of this approach would be
that only explicable concepts will be represented, and the
problem-solving process might be changed by this second
task. This also holds true for (2) and (3).
(5) Eye-movement data could help to evaluate the importance
of the given information for the problem-solving process
(Knoblich et al., 2005).
(6) In the future, it is conceivable that new brain-imaging
techniques will help to monitor coherent states in the brain.
Recently Huth et al. (2016) were able to map natural speech
to certain tiles of the cerebral cortex given fMRI data and
sophisticated statistical methods.
We assume that a detailed understanding of coherence-
building is the key to answer the questions when and why a
biased or inappropriate representation leads to false intuitions or
why problem solvers get stuck in an impasse. We also assume
that to pinpoint the processes and knowledge structure it is
crucial to decide whether a problem is solved with or without
insight. Nowadays, we either rely on the weak and tautological
assumptions that insight problems require insight, or we rely
on subjective experience like indicating an Aha! (Öllinger and
Knoblich, 2009).
DISCUSSION
We demonstrated that intuition and insight share some
significant features and could be explained within a four-stage
model. In both domains constraints play an important role.
Constraints drive coherent states (Thagard, 2002), but also
restrict the search space. Prior knowledge imposes rules and
activates heuristics and problem solving strategies (Ohlsson,
2011). Intuition is in our understanding a result of a mainly
automatic and implicit process which results from constraining
processes and simple heuristics and rules which could lead to the
solution or could be misleading.
A simple pattern matching mechanism guides the selection
of competing rules or heuristics (Kruglanski and Gigerenzer,
2011). The selected rule determines the processing of the
given information and determines the frame for the coherence
building process. E.g., in our three dot example we showed
that according to the selected rules, the three dots could cohere
in a triangle, number representation, or social interactions.
Spreading activation (Collins and Loftus, 1975) and the variation
of combinatorial links between remote concepts are key features
which help to come up with new coherent states of difficult
problems (Hélie and Sun, 2010).
Coherence in this framework could be understood as state
of balance (Heider, 1946), in which the concepts within the
constraint representation have a consistent interrelatedness
without conflicts. Such a state leads to a higher process fluency
which causes detectable behavioral changes (Wagner et al., 2004;
Topolinski and Strack, 2009c). Gestalt nodes (Lakoff, 2009) stand
for the condensed meaning of the linked concepts and bind the
given pieces of information together. Additionally, new meanings
(links) could emerge by the binding processes. At the neural
level, it seems plausible that Hebbian learning plays an important
role and strengthens the connection between simultaneously
activated concepts.
Our model extends Bowers et al. (1990) model in a few
aspects. In contrast to Bowers’ model we assume a constraining
process at the guiding stage in addition to spreading activation.
Importantly, the accumulation of information is not a necessary
criterion for a coherent state in our model. The coherence-
building in our model is implemented by constraint satisfaction.
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The result is a balanced state. If such a state is reached, then
the process fluency will increase, and cause behavioral changes
(Wagner et al., 2004). Those changes foster that the coherent state
surpasses the threshold to consciousness. Coherence-building
is recursive, widely implicit and consists of conflict resolution
and the integration of information. The process is affected and
guided by attentional processes and deliberate thinking. We
also emphasized the existence of a restructuring stage which
overcomes already elicited coherent representations by changing
the search space. This indicates a qualitative change in the
problem-solving process. Still the constraint satisfaction process
is active, but now more remote concepts could be integrated
in a new representation. As we showed variation plays an
important role to build those new associations (Fedor et al.,
2017). In our understanding restructuring demarcates intuition
from insight. Intuition could result from the realization of a
coherent representation resulting in a hunch how a problem
could be solved and accompanied by affective and cognitive
processes. Whereas insight results from a restructured problem
representation which allows a new and unusual solution to a
problem which suddenly leads to a deep understanding of the
given problem. That means intuition evaluates the coherence of
the given information, whereas insight evaluates the result of
restructuring.
OPEN QUESTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
An important premise that the four-stage model made is that
constraint satisfaction and binding are the basic processes, one at
a cognitive, the other a neural level. There are alternative accounts
that question the idea of binding by synchrony (Hayworth,
2012) or provide alternative accounts for the combination of
information, such as the latching mechanism provided by Amati
and Shallice (2007), Song et al. (2014) or binding by convolution
introduced by Thagard and Stewart (2011). We leave this
question open to be answered by future work. We are positive
about the fact that our model would also work with an alternative
binding process.
Another open point is why the system tends to search for
a coherent or state of balance? Related to this point is the
question, is it possible that there are problems where imbalance
is necessary to solve the problem? Furthermore, it would be
helpful to determine at an individual level, which traits of
characteristics of personality increase the probability of finding
coherence.
The notion of a rule-based account is also questionable. This
refers to the notion of dual systems. Dual system accounts
in general differentiate between a fast, unconscious, unlimited,
holistic (system 1) and a slow, deliberate, logical, restricted system
(system 2) (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2012). Insight and intuition
are often assigned to system 1 processes. For many years, there
have been discussions, whether such two separate systems, modes
or processes are necessary, plausible, well-defined and complete
(Evans, 2008; Kruglanski and Gigerenzer, 2011; Kahneman, 2012;
Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Mega et al., 2015).
In our line of argumentation, we followed Kruglanski and
Gigerenzer (2011) who proposed a rule-based account in which
the rules range between an explicit and implicit level. We think
this account is also supported by the modeling accounts we
reviewed above (Hélie and Sun, 2010; Thomson et al., 2015).
In contrast, Evans and Stanovich (2013) disagree with this
proposal and argue that there are clear indicators for two systems.
Most important would be the fact that only system 2 supports
hypothetical thinking and showed heavy working memory load.
Again, we are not in a position to resolve this discussion right
now, but we think that our model might help to search for unified
processes which vary in the processing stage.
In sum, we hope to demonstrate a more general model on
insight and intuition which shows that insight and intuition are
the two different sides of the same coin.
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